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WALL OF SEPARATION - JUDICIAL GYJOSS
ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Paul M. Butler* and Alfred L. Scanlan**
Introduction
As the Second Session of the 87th Congress convened, the question of
both the propriety and the constitutionality of federal assistance to private,
sectarian educational institutions remained as a controversial item for the
Congress and the country to debate, if not to resolve.' Points of view are always
plentiful and diverse on this emotion-laden subject; for the most part, com-
promise and dispassionate analysis are strangers to the argument. Some continue
to maintain that any sort of government action which confers some benefit, how-
ever indirect, on sectarian educational institutions, cannot and should not pass
muster under the first amendment.2 Others contend that if the primary purpose
of a congressional enactment is the public welfare, the fact that religious educa-
tional institutions also may be incidentally benefited does not render it consti-
tutionally objectionable.' Bolder proponents of federal aid to religious schools
even have advanced the argument that not to include church-related schools
in any overall program of federal assistance to education is discriminatory, per-
haps rising to the level of a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment,4 as well as of the free exercise clause of the first amendment. At the other
extreme are those who complain that even the singing of traditional Christmas
carols on public school time transgresses the no establishment clause.' And re-
cently a novel, but logically appealing, argument has been made that federal
assistance which can be allocated to the secular activities of church-related
schools is constitutional, while direct federal aid to religious instruction main-
tained in such schools is not.'
* LL.B., University of Notre Dame Law School, 1927; formerly a member of the Indiana
and District of Columbia bars and the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States; Na-
tional Chairman of the Democratic Party, 1954-1960. Mr. Butler died on December 30, 1961
while this article was in a state of preparation, and did not live to see it in final draft. How-
ever, the views expressed in this article represent those which were held by Mr. Butler, as
well as those now entertained by the co-author.
** A.B., Columbia University, 1941; LL.B. and LL.M., George Washington University
Law School, 1946 and 1947 respectively; member of the bars of the District of Columbia,
Indiana, Maryland and the Supreme Court of the United States; partner in the firm of Shea
& Gardner, Washington, D.C.
I By his State of the Union message to the Congress, the President again indicated his
determination to seek legislation to provide financial aid to public primary and secondary
schools, but not to include assistance to private schools at this level. Washington Evening
Star, January 10, 1962, pp. A-1,8. On several occasions prior to this time, the President has
stated his opinion that the exclusion of federal aid for "church schools" was based on and
in "accordance with the clear prohibition of the Constitution. ... " The New York Times,
February 21, 1961, p. 1.
2 Konvitz, Separation of Church and State: The First Freedom, 14 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 44, 59 (1949).
3 See, e.g., the remarks of Professor Sutherland, of the Harvard Law School, as reported
in the Catholic Standard, March 10, 1961, p. 1.
4 Blus, Religious Liberty and Bus Transportation, 30 NOTRE DAME LAW'R 384, 437
(1955); see also the well-publicized statement of the Bishops composing the administrative
board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, as reported in The New York Times,
March 2, 1961, pp. 1, 14.
5 Washington Evening Star, January 9, 1962, p. B-1.
6 The Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church Related Schools In Federal Aid to
Education, a memorandum prepared by the Legal Department of the National Catholic
Welfare Conference, (December 14, 1961), p. 54.
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WALL OF SEPARATION
In this article, we have eschewed, to the extent possible, all comment on
the wisdom or justice of federal aid to religious educational institutions, and
have attempted to confine discussion to the legal issue involved.
Even on this issue, the authors are not presumptuous enough to predict
which point of view will prevail in the long run. And while they have their
own firm convictions as to which of the varying opinions concerning federal
aid to religious schools is not correct, they are not so bold as to pick those that
may prove to be right. Rather, our purpose in this article is to review pertinent
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, to demonstrate that, what-
ever the proposed form or forms of federal aid to church-related schools, the
proponents of such aid must take into careful account the fact that the Court,
at least as now constituted, has adopted an interpretation of the first amend-
ment that makes its task more difficult than perhaps the founding fathers might
have intended. In short, Jefferson's facile figure of speech, "a wall of separation
between church and state" has now been grafted on the text of the first amend-
ment. Henceforth, at least until the present composition of the Supreme Court
is substantially altered, the amendment must be read as though that phrase
were written into it, however at variance this may be with American constitu-
tional history and with the origins and traditions of the nation. This purpose
may strike the reader as limited enough in objective. Nevertheless, however true
that may be, we believe that long-run progress may be served best in this in-
stance by accurate understanding and acceptance of the present, or short-run,
obstacles to its achievement.
The Argument from History
The first amendment provides in pertinent part as follows:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....
As later pointed out, the Supreme CQurt has given the no establishment
clause of the first amendment an interpretation under which, apparently, any
federal aid, whether direct or indirect, to a sectarian 'school, will have a pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality running against it. Clearly, the Court, as it is
now constituted, appears determined to read the first amendment as if it were
set out in terms of Jefferson's now famous metaphor. As a consequence, the
type of federal assistance to church-related schools that can survive the test of
constitutionality may be severely restricted, provided, however, that there is
anyone with standing to bring such a test.'
On this point, we align ourselves, presumptuously perhaps, with a distin-
guished scholar whose research, we believe, establishes that the Court's sub-
stitution of Jefferson's descriptive but isolated phrase for the text of the no
establishment clause disregards American constitutional history and national
traditions.8 As Professor Corwin of Princeton has extensively documented, the
clear purpose of the first amendment was to prohibit the federal government
from establishing a national religion, or from affording any religion or reli-
7 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) discussed infra, p. 306.
8 Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAw & 'CONTEMi,. PRoB.
1 (1949).
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gions "a preferred status."9 Despite Justice Rutledge's attempt to establish other-
wise in his dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Education,"0 and Justice
Black's subsequent adoption of Justice Rutledge's unpersuasive reading of Ameri-
can constitutional history in McCollum v. Board of Education," Professor Cor-
win's study has not been discredited.
At the time of the adoption of the first amendment, a number of States
had established or quasi-established religions. Some persisted for many years
after the ratification of the first amendment. When the amendment was pro-
posed, several of the original states had just eliminated, or were in the pro-
cess of eliminating, established religions. There was a strong popular desire on
both sides of the fight to keep the new (and suspected) national government
out of the struggle and to insure that it did not interfere." Perhaps as authorita-
tive a statement as any is Justice Story's summary of the situation which existed
at the time of the adoption of the first amendment, as he stated it in 1833:
The situation . . . of the different states equally proclaimed
the policy, as well as the necessity of such an exclusion. In some
of the states, Episcopalians constituted the predominant sect; in
others, Presbyterians; in others, Congregationalists; in others,
Quakers; and in others again, there was a close numerical rivalry
among contending sects. It was impossible, that there should not
arise perpetual strife and perpetual jealousy on the subject of ecclesi-
astical ascendency, if the national government were left free to create
a religious establishment The only security was in extirpating
the power. But this alone would have been an imperfect security,
if it had not been followed up by a declaration of the right of the
free exercise of religion, and a prohibition (as we have seen) of all
religious tests. Thus, the whole power over the subject of religion
is .left exclusively to the state governments, to be acted upon accord-
ing to their own sense of justice, and the state constitutions; and the
Catholic and the Protestant, the Calvinist and the Arminian, the
Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at the common table of the na-
tional councils, without any inquisition into their faith, or mode
of worship.13
Even Jefferson, whose figure of speech seems now to have been slipped
into the first amendment, might have been surprised to learn that his words
have been substituted for penetrating and persuasive legislative history of the
amendment. For example, Jefferson has written that religion was "a supple-
ment of law in the government of man," and "the alpha and omega of the
moral law." 4 Moreover, Jefferson gave his express approval to the establish-
ment of a divinity school at the University of Virginia, a public institution."
At least one scholar has gone slightly beyond Professor Corwin in arguing
that the Supreme Court has ignored compelling evidence from constitutional
history in adopting the construction which it has given the no establishment
clause of the first amendment. Professor and Father Kenealy, S.J., former dean
9 Id. at 10.
10 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
11 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
12 Corwin, supra note 8, at 11-12.
13 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, 1 1879 (1833); see also, COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 469 (1871).
14 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 33 (H.A. Washington, ed. 1896).
15 PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-519 (1943).
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of the Boston College Law School, has stated that the first amendment was
"an express declaration of a principle of Federalism which guaranteed, as against
federal interference, exclusive state power over religion. ,16
In any event, we believe that whatever compelling justification may exist
in favor of a strict construction of the no establishment clause, and the restric-
tions it places on governmental action which benefits sectarian schools, it can-
not be found in American constitutional history which establishes that the
no establishment clause was intended only to prohibit the federal government
from setting up an official religion, from preferring a religion or religions, and
from taxing its citizens to achieve either one or the other of those two prohibited
purposes.
The argument from history seems confirmed by that drawn from national
tradition and practice. For example, tax exemptions for religious institutions
and property have been accepted in the Uiited States from the time the Con-
stitution was adopted.Y Indeed, in 1875, President Grant suggested a con-
stitutional amendment to provide "that all church property shall bear its own
proportion of taxation."' 8 Down to 1929, amendments of the type suggested
by President Grant had been introduced and re-introduced in the Congress some
20 times. 9 None of these proposals ever passed. If tax exemptions for religious
schools were thought to be a violation of the Constitution, these oft-renewed but
never successful proposed constitutional amendments were an exercise in the
unnecessary.
The state courts almost universally have sustained the constitutionality
under state constitutions of tax exemptions for religious institutions.20 The Su-
preme Court has never passed on the precise issue. Nevertheless, it seems to
have accepted, at least sub silentio, the proposition that whatever federal or
state aid may be prohibited by the "wall of separation of church and State,"
the granting of tax exemptions to religious groups gerierally is not barred.2
We will take only passing note of the many manifestationm of the federal
government's cooperation with, and, to be candid, assistance to, religion and
religious institutions, including church-related schools. The presence of chap-
lains in the Congress of the United States and in the armed forces comes im-
mediately to mind. "In God We Trust," at least when we last looked, was
still the motto inscribed on the coins being turned out at the Mint in Washington.
More compelling instances abound of Congressionally-authorized assistance
to secular institutions, including religious schools. The authors note here only
some of the more prominent illustrations of such federal aid, direct or indirect.
Representative examples include: financial grants to sectarian hospitals under
the Hospital Construction Act;22 tuition payments to denominational colleges,
16 Kenealy, Tax Aid to Education 7 (1961) (unpublished memorandum).
17 Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax & Labor Legislation, 14 LAw &
CONTEEP. PROB. 144 (1949).
18 AMES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 277 (1897).
19 MuISMANNO, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO TEE CONSTITUTION 182 (1929).
20 Paulsen, supra note 17.
21 Lundberg v. Alameda County, 46 Cal.2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, app. dismissed, 352 U.S.
921 (1956).
22 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), 42 U.S.C. 291b, 291i(g) (1957).
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including divinity schools, under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act;"8 dis-
bursements to "non-profit, private schools" under the federal school lunch pro-
gram, in which children attending parochial schools share;24 and payments of
tuition directly to private or parochial schools attended by the pages of the
Supreme Court, as well as by those of the Congress.2 5 Finally, we refer to the
far more inclusive list of federal programs under which religious institutions
have been the beneficiaries of federal assistance, which has been compiled by
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.2
So far as research reveals, no attack grounded on the first amendment has
been made on the constitutionality of the federal assistance furnished under the
statutes referred to above, as well as under others contained in the recent mem-
orandum prepared by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Lack
of challenge, much less successful challenge, obviously does not mean that the
issue has been decided in all these instances. Nevertheless, it is credible evidence
that Congress, in enacting programs under which religious institutions were
substantially benefited, was acting in accordance with a well-established national
tradition, and was not, in any sense, impairing or ignoring the basic consti-
tutional guarantees of religious freedom, including the no establishment clause,
as these are written into the first amendment.
The Earlier Cases and the Emergence of the Child
or Public Benefit Concept
To this day, the decisions of the Supreme Court which stake out the scope
of the no establishment clause of the first amendment (including the extent that
the liberties protected by it are now embraced within the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment) are quite few. Still, we think that the Court
has said enough on these isolated occasions to have provided several accepted
propositions regarding the constitutional power possessed by the federal gov-
ernment and the states to provide financial or other assistance which may
confer some benefit, either direct or indirect, on secular institutions, including
schools maintained by or affiliated with such institutions.
Until recently, at least, we believe that the principles which justifiably could
be gleaned from the decisions were as follows: First, it is incontestable that
government in this country is not hostile to religion or toward religious insti-
tutions. As the Court stated in Holy Trinity Church v. United States," we are,
indeed, "a religious people." Our "laws . . . customs and society" constitute
a "recognition of [that] truth." Holy Trinity, of course, is the landmark case
supporting the canon of statutory construction that holds a word or term may
fall within the letter of a statute, yet not be embraced within its spirit or with-
in the intention of the framers of the enactment. On the point under discus-
sion here, however, its importance lies in the detailed statement which the Court
23 58 Stat. 284, 290 (1944), 38 U.S.C. 739 (1946).
24 60 Stat. 230, 233 (1946), 42 U.S.C. 1753, 1759 (1957).
25 60 Stat. 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. 88a(c) (1961).
26 Federal Programs Under Which Institutions With Religious Affiliations Receive Federal
Funds Through Loans or Grants, a memorandum prepared by the legal staff of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, March 28, 1961. Nearly 50 such statutory programs
are listed therein.
27 143 U.S. 457, 462-72 (1892).
WALL OF SEPARATION
made in that case summarizing the religious tradition of the states and of the
Union "which the whole history and life 6f the country affirm.. ..." We as-
sume that this remains true, and as the Court has more recently noted, that
nothing written into the first amendment or implied from its historical purpose
requires that "the state and religion ... be aliens to each other, hostile, sus-
picious, and even unfriendly.""8
A more recent example of the special place and unique standing which
religion holds with the Congress and the Court is provided by the exemption
from military service permitted ministers of religion and the members of cer-
tain religious sects.2" Mention might also be made here of Reynolds v. United
States."° In that case, the Supreme Court held that there was nothing in the
first amendment rendering unconstitutional a statute of the United States out-
lawing polygamy in its Territories. The decision is especially interesting, since
it seems to be the first instance in which the Supreme Court referred to Jeffer-
son's well-known letter to the Danbury Baptists, using the phrase "a wall of
separation between church and State." 1 Moreover, in the Reynolds case, the
Court read the first amendment exclusively in the terms of a protection of rights
of conscience and religious freedom, rather than from the point of view of the
no establishment clause, going on to hold that, nevertheless, such freedoms are
not violated when the sovereign acts to punish violations of social duties or to
outlaw actions which are subversive of good order.
Next, we take it, perhaps too sanguinely, that even the bitterest opponents
of federal aid to church-related schools would not dispute the propositions of
constitutional law which were established in Pierce v. Society of Sisters," and
Myer v. Nebraska" In the Pierce case, the Court struck down an Oregon
statute which required every parent or guardian of children between 8 and 16
years of age to send such children to the public schools of the State. The prin-
ciples drawn from Pierce are several. Clearly, the decision holds that there is
no power in the state to monopolize education and also reaffirms the axiomatic
truth, at least as it prevails in the Anglo-Saxon cultures, that the "child is not
the mere creature of the State." 4 Equally important, and perhaps more pertinent
to the instant discussion, Pierce stands for the proposition that parents may,
in discharging their obligations under state compulsory education laws, send
their children to private schools, including church-related schools, if the latter
meet the minimum secular educational requirements which the state has the
constitutional authority to impose. The parents' right to do this is just that, and
a right which is part of the liberty which the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment guards and which the fifth amendment also protects in the
federal sphere.
Myer v. Nebraska," endorsed a principle of perhaps lesser but, neverthe-
less, relevant importance. The Supreme Court in that case struck down a
28 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)
29 The Selective Service Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918).
30 98 U.S. 145, 164-166 (1878).
31 Id. at 164.
32 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
33 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
34 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
35 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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Nebraska statute which made it a crime for any teacher to teach any subject
in any elementary school in any language other than English. The Court re-
fused to sustain Nebraska's attempt to interfere "with the opportunities of
pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the edu-
cation of their young." 6
Turning now to the earlier cases which deal more precisely with the issue
under examination in this article, we find the Supreme Court in Bradfield v.
Roberts, 7 holding that an Act of Congress appropriating money for the con-
struction of a building on the grounds of a Roman Catholic hospital in the
District of Columbia was not in conflict with the no establishment clause of
the first amendment. There was no argument, in the mind of the Court, con-
cerning the congressional power to "appropriate money for the purpose ex-
pressed in the appropriation," or the power of the district commissioners to
enter into the contract with the Catholic hospital. The Court regarded the fact
that the hospital was conducted under the auspices of the Roman Catholic
church as "wholly immaterial," since its primary function was "for the care
of such sick and invalid persons as may place themselves under the treatment"
of the hospital.38
Thirty-one years after the Bradfield decision, but prior to the time when
the Supreme Court had conclusively determined that the "fundamental liberties"
protected under the first amendment were incorporated in the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment," the Court was called upon to decide in Cochran
v. Louisiana State Board of Education," whethex an appropriation by a State
of tax-raised money to supply free textbooks for children in private schools,
including sectarian schools, as well as for pupils attending public schools, vio-
lated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The first amend-
ment point was not directly involved in the case, the plaintiffs contending only
that they were being taxed to support a private purpose and not expressly re-
lying on any claim of impairment of religious freedom or departure from no
establishment. In sustaining the statute in question and the appropriation of
public funds to provide textbooks to private schools, including church-related
schools, the Court stated:
The legislation does not segregate private schools or their pupils
as its beneficiaries, or attempt to interfere with any matters of ex-
clusively private concern. Its interest is education broadly; its meth-
od comprehensive. Individual interests are aided only as the com-
mon interest is safeguarded.4 1
36 Id. at 401.
37 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
38 Id. at 299-300. The case of Quickbear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), decided subsequent
to Bradfield v. Roberts, but prior to the Cochran case, also merits mention. In Quickbear, the
Supreme Court sustained a contract made at the request of Indians that public monies due
them under a treaty with the United States be paid by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
for the support of Indian Catholic mission schools. Although the case is distinguishable
on the grounds that the monies appropriated were out of sums held in trust for the Indians,
it is significant that the Court rejected an argument that the spirit of the first amendment
required that "the Government phall make no appropriation whatever for education for any
secular schools." 210 U.S. 50, 72 (1908).
39 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
40 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
41 Id. at 375.
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Finally, the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education,42 a decision
discussed in more detail below, sustained the right of a New Jersey township
to pay for the transportation of parochial school children on public buses against
the contention that the challenged practice violated the first amendment as
incorporated in the fourteenth. The New Jersey statute involved in Everson
had been implemented by a resolution of the township which authorized dis-
bursement of the taxpayers' money for transportation of school children to and
from school, but limited those benefits to children attending public schools
and Catholic schools. Recently in a Connecticut decision,"3 the Court was given
an opportunity to reopen the issues decided in Everson. However, it declined
to do so.
As we note below, the Everson case may have been a pyrrhic victory for
the proponents of federal and state assistance to church-related schools per-
forming the public function of educating the young. Yet, with that decision, a
certain outline of the permissible scope of federal or state aid to church-related
schools seemed to have been established. As we discern it, it would be made
up of the following premises:
Neither the federal nor the state -governments are hostile to religion; "the
child is not a creature of the State," and a parent has the right to educate
his child in a non-public, church-related or religious school, provided that the
latter meets the minimum secular standards constitutionally imposed by the
state; 4 appropriation of public funds undertaken for a valid public purpose,
such as increasing facilities for the care of the sick, or the education of the
young, are not laws "respecting an establishment of religion," even if sectarian
schools and their pupils may also be benefited thereby.4"
If the above-stated propositions of constitutional law, especially the child
benefit concept, still prevail, the proponents of federal or state aid to parochial
schools, or the pupils of such schools, may rest easily. Surely, the public service
functions performed by non-public schools, including those operated under secu-
lar auspices, are manifest. An impartial observer of their works has aptly stated:
Parochial schools are, in fact, public institutions, though they are
not governmentally sponsored and operated. They perform a public
function, supplying large numbers of children with an education
that is everywhere taken as the equivalent of the education given
in the public schools. They have full public recognition as educa-
tional agencies. Their credits, diplomas and certificates have ex-
actly the same validity as those issued by Governmental establish-
ments.46
42 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
43 Snyder v. Newton, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), app. dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question, 365 U.S. 299 (1961). Justices Frankfurter and Douglas
would have noted probable jurisdiction in the Snyder case.
44 The regulation by a state of private school curricula has been upheld over the objec-
tion that such action violated the religious beliefs of pupils and their parents. In The Matter
of Weberman, 198 Misc. 1055, 100 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1951). Would the State's support of the
same curricula in the same religious school or schools constitute the "establishment of re-
ligion"? Up to Everson, we would believe the answer clearly would have to have been in
the negative.
45 Cf., Carmichael v. Southwestern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 518 (1937).
46 HERBERO, JUSTICE FOR RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS: A NON-CATHOLIC VIEw, 7-8 (1958);
see also Meiklejohn, Educational Cooperation Between Church and State, 14 LAw & CONTnMP.
PROB. 61 (1949).
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Later Cases: Does Strict Separation Displace
No Establishment as the Constitutional Standard?
It is true that at least the result reached in Everson v. Board of Education,"
supports the position that legislation or appropriations passed for the benefit of
the public as a whole, or an identifiable segment of the public, selected with-
out discrimination, do not violate the no establishment clause of the first amend-
ment, as this provision has been assimilated by judicial decision under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Still, as close students of the Court
were immediately aware,4" the proponents of federal or state aid to parochial
schools were entitled, after analysis of the Everson decision, to repeat the words
of the ancient King Pyrrhus who, surveying the dreadful carnage inflicted on
his troops in a costly victory over the Roman legions, is alleged to have said,
"One more such victory and I am undone."
Nevertheless, as stated above, comfort could be drawn from the actual
decision arrived at, as well as from the opinion of the majority, wherein the
Court stated that in guarding the ramparts of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments:
[W]e must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey
against state established churches to be sure that we do not in-
advertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state
law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious be-
liefs. (Emphasis supplied.) 49
Unfortunately, such approval of the public benefit concept as can be found
in Justice Black's majority opinion seems obfuscated by other aspects of the
decision. In the first place, Everson squarely holds that whatever prohibitions
the no establishment clause of the first amendment may place upon the federal
government, similar limitations now are laid upon the states through incor-
poration of the first amendment into the due process concept embraced within
the fourteenth." While such a holding may appear logical and serve symmetry
of interpretation of the first amendment, wherein both free exercise and no
establishment bind both the nation and the states, still it is not a proposition
with solid support in American constitutional history. For instance, Professor
Crosskey (whose recent, revolutionary and landmark study of the original mean-
ing of the Constitution and the first ten amendments strangely has been ig-
nored by the Court, as well as by many scholars on this and other issues of
Constitutional interpretation) has this to say:
The history of their framing [i.e., the clauses comprising the first
amendment] shows, in the plainest way, that the first amendment
was deliberately drawn to create a field not only of exclusive but
of inviolable state power "respecting" religious establishments; ...
(Emphasis supplied. ) 5 1
We pass the point, however. Whatever the original congressional intention
regarding the scope and extent of the power of the states respecting the estab-
47 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
48 Blum, supra note 4, at 412.
49 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
50 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947); see also, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
51 2 CROSStEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1057 (1953).
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lishment of religion, we believe that it is too late in the day to argue that the
states are now barred from legislative action which affects the free exercise of
religion, but are not now prohibited from establishing, preferring, or directly
supporting or assisting religious sects, including institutions maintained by those
sects.5 2
Even more disturbing to those who entertain the view that federal aid to
church-related schools is constitutional should have been the following language
of Justice Black's Everson opinion:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the first amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the federal government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-at-
tendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the federal government can, openly
or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a
wall of separation between Church and State."53
For a while, proponents of federal aid to church-related schools may have
tried to reassure themselves that the stark, strict principle which Justice Black
appeared to have enunciated in the paragraph quoted above could be taken
as no more than dictum, and unnecessary to the decision actually handed down
by the Court. As we shall discuss immediately below, those who may have read
his language in this fashion were quite mistaken. Justice Black meant what he
said. More importantly, it now appears that a substantial majority of the Su-
preme Court of the United States agrees with him.
Four Justices dissented in Everson. All four joined in a long opinion by the
late Justice Rutledge,". in which he attempted to prove from constitutional his-
tory that the prohibitions of the no establishment clause "broadly forbid[s] state
support, financial or other, of religion in any guise,. form, or degree. It outlaws
all use of public funds for religious purposes." In the main, Justice Rutledge
went about establishing his thesis by relying on certain actions and statements
of James Madison, undertaken by the latter not only in connection with the
composition and introduction of the proposal that became the first amendment,
but also as part of his activities in the fight which he led in Virginia against
the Assessment Bill. This proposal, finally defeated, was a tax measure for the
support of religion, but under which each taxpayer would have the privilege
of designating which church should receive his share of the tax, and if he de-
signated none, the legislature could apply it to pious uses."
52 Scanlan, Book Review, 19 GEo. WAsH. L. Rv. 114, 117 (1950).
53 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
54 Id. at 28-74.
55 Id. at 36.
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The authors believe that a more comprehensive and objective analysis of
the legislative history of the first amendment, including documented research
concerning the exact role that Madison played in its introduction and passage,
justify Professor Corwin's conclusion "that Justice Rutledge sold his brethren
a bill of goods when he persuaded them that the 'establishment of religion'
- clause of the first amendment was intended to rule out all governmental 'aid
to all religions'."5 Moreover, since Professor Corwin first stated his persuasive
case against the conclusions reached by Justice Rutledge concerning the his-
torical origins of the first amendment in Everson, Professor Crosskey's illuminat-
ing work has been printed. If doubt remained whether it is Justice Rutledge or
Professor Corwin who has more accurately discerned the purpose or purposes
of the first amendment, Crosskey's research would seem to have dispelled it,
despite the silence or indifference which, for the most part, seems to have been
afforded his scholarly and detailed treatment of the subject." Crosskey's con-
clusions, it could be argued, should be entitled to special credibility, since the
whole burden and thrust of the novel thesis set forth in his two-volume work
on the Constitution is that the enumerated powers set forth in article 1, section
8 of the Federal Constitution were not intended as a total enumeration of powers
bestowed on the Congress, but only to make it clear what the legislative branch
had authority to do, as opposed to the executive branch of the new govern-
ment. In no sense can Crosskey be counted as a supporter of the "states' rights"
theory of constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, his carefully documented
opinion that the no establishment clause of the first amendment, as finally en-
acted, was intended exclusively to keep the new federal government from med-
dling with establishment or disestablishment in the states should be entitled
to great weight.
Be that as it may, Justice Rutledge's view of the constitutional history of
the first amendment obviously was accepted by most of the majority and all
of the minority Justices in the Everson case. And as we show below, this opinion
apparently continues to prevail in the thinking of the present members of the
Supreme Court of the United States. That this was fact was soon established
by the decision in McCollum v. Board of Education.5" The case involved the
released time religious education program imposed by a local Illinois school
board. Under the program, public school pupils were permitted to attend classes
in religious instruction conducted during school hours and upon school prem-
ises, by teachers representing a number of religious faiths. The pupils who did
not attend these religious instruction sessions were required to utilize the time
in studying their regular subjects. The program was attacked on the grounds
that it violated the first and fourteenth amendments. The Supreme Court held
56 Corwin, The Supreme Court As National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
1, 16 (1949). See also, Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 23, 41-
43 (1949). Together, the historical materials cited by Corwin and Father Murray almost
irrefutably demonstrate that Madison understood the purposes of the no establishment clause
as limited to preventing the new federal government from establishing, or according preference
in law to, a national religion, or from compelling men to worship in manner contrary to
their consciences.
57 Crosskey, op. cit. supra, note 51 at pp. 1057, 1058, 1060-1061, 1068 (especially) 1072
& 1077.
58 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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the program unconstitutional and "a utilization of the tax established and tax
supported public school system to aid religious Aroups to spread their faith.""
Not only were public school buildings used for the dissemination of religious
doctrine, but the State also [afforded] secular groups an "invaluable aid [in
helping] to provide pupils for the religious classes through the use of the State's
compulsory public school machinery."6
The result in McCollum perhaps might be justified, even by the proponents
of federal aid to church-related schools without too much concern that the child
or public benefit theory had been impaired. After all, as the Court
found, the State's compulsory education system in that case was directly in-
tegrated with the program of religious education carried on by [some, but not
all] separate religious sects. The power of the State, very directly, and apparent-
ly quite indispensably if the program were to succeed, was utilized to teach
sectarian doctrines. It is difficult to resist the force of the argument
that the legislative, or more properly administrative, action involved in Mc-
Collum was action "respecting the establishment of religion," even more pre-
cisely, establishing the dogma of some religious sects.
However, it is not the result in McCollum which should most have dis-
tressed the proponents of federal or state aid to church-related schools. Rather,
it was the fact that the Court in that case specifically rejected the more per-'
suasive historical analysis represented by Professor Corwin's view concerning
the congressional intention behind the adoption of the first amendment and also
expressly turned aside a challenge made by the attorneys for the respondent
Board of Education who maintained that the gratuitous strictures of Justice Black
in the Everson case, as previously referred to, were merely 'dicta. Said the Court:
"We are unable to accept either of these contentions."'" Beyond this, the ma-
jority opinion written by Justice Black three times employed the phrase "wall
of separation between church and state." With McCollum, has the doctrine
of absolute separation displaced the more flexible concept seemingly reflected
in, and apparently intended by, the no establishment clause?
The Court's drift in the direction of absolute separation seems to have
been arrested, temporarily at least, in Zorach v. ClausonY Again, a released
59 Id. at 210.
60 Id. at 212.
61 Id. at 211. It is interesting to note, however, that the four dissenters of the Everson
case joined in a concurring opinion in McCollum, delivered by Justice Frankfurter. In it,
speaking through the latter, the concurring Justices reaffirmed 'their view that the first and
fourteenth amendments "have a secular reach far more penetrating in the conduct of Govern-
ment than merely to forbid an 'established church'." Id. at 213. Thereafter, Justice Frank-
furter goes on to recite what he believes to be the relevant history of religious education and
the secularization of public schools in the United States. His remarks are a well-documented
statement on the subject. However, the opinion does not throw any additional light on the
meaning of the no establishment clause. Perhaps Justice Frankfurter's elaborate presentation
of the story of the conceded secularization of the public schools of America was thought
necessary on his part in order to buttress the weakness in the argument based on history as
Justice Rutledge had made it in Everson, and which the Court, even including Justice
Frankfurter, seemed to have accepted in the McCollum case. The authors agree that "due
process," and maybe even "no establishment" are not static, but dynamic and flexible constitu-
tional concepts. If so, it may be that the rigidity of the "absolute wall of separation" approach
will some day give way to the point of view that maintains that some forms of governmental
assistance to church-related schools violate neither the first nor the fourteenth amendments.
62 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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time program was involved, as in McCollum. However, in Zorach, the pro-
gram took place off the preriiises of the schools. Nevertheless, as in the Mc-
Collum case, the student who did not participate was required to remain in
his classroom, and the administrative machinery of the public school system
was employed in conducting the program. Even on close, hair-splitting analysis,
it is difficult to discern any substantial difference in the fact situation pre-
sented in Zorach, as opposed to that involved in McCollum. Four Justices dis-
sented, holding fast to McCollum, and as Justice Jackson said in his separate
dissenting opinion in the case, "The distinction attempted between [McCollum]
. . . and this [case] is trivial, almost to the point of cynicism, magnifying its
nonessential details... . The McCollum case has passed like a tempest in a
teacup."6 3 The very fact that Justice Jackson may have been right and that
any distinctions between the two cases were those without differences should
have encouraged the critics of the Court's decision in the McCollum case.
Sophistry sometimes is the only way to justify a change of mind or course of
judicial decisions. In any event, the proponents of federal or state aid to re-
ligious schools certainly were entitled to take comfort, not only in what was
done in Zorach v. Clauson, but in what the Court, through Justice Douglas,
one of the staunchest defenders of civil liberties, had to say in his majority
opinion:
The first amendment... does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be a separation of church and state. Rather it studiously
defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no
concert or union or dependency one on the other. That is the com-
mon sense of the matter. Otherwise, the state and religion would
be aliens to each other - hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.
Churches could not be required to pay even property taxes. Munici-
palities would not be permitted to render police or fire protection
to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into their
places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our
legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of
the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving
Day a holiday; "so help me God" in our courtroom oath - these
and all other references to the Almightly that run through our laws,
our public rituals, our ceremonies, would be flouting the first
amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to
the supplication with which the Court opens each session: "God
save the United States and this Honorable Court." 64
This was comforting enough, but Justice Douglas further went on to say,
in language that would be appropriate for a statement or brochure issued by
the proponents of federal or state aid to church-related schools, that:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. . . . When the state encourages religious instruction or
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of
public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our tradi-
tions. For then it respects the religious nature of our people and
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold
that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement
that the Government show a callous indifference to religious groups.
63 Id. at 325.
64 Id. at 312-13.
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That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe.0 5
However, as we indicate in the next section of this article, despite the reas-
suring dicta quoted above, it seems that it is Zorach which may be the abbera-
tional decision and not McCollum, so far as concerns the constitutional issue
of federal aid to religious schools.
Tuition Payments, Blue Laws and Test Oaths:
First, Silence and Then, Secularism
The 1960-61 term of the Supreme Court provided three cases of pertinent
interest to the subject under discussion. None, however, furnished any sub-
stantial support for those maintaining the constitutionality of federal aid to
church-related schools. The first case arose in Vermont.6 Under a statute of
that State, enacted in 1915, each Vermont town district which did not maintain
or furnish secondary instruction for its pupils was authorized to pay the tuition
of such pupils who attended high schools in other school districts. A limit was
placed on the tuition that could be paid and the statute required that the school
selected by pupils who had to receive their secondary instruction elsewhere be
one recognized by the State. Although the statute was silent on the point, the
administrative practice was that tuition payments could be either to the schools
attended by the pupils, or to the parents or guardians upon bills submitted.6
Some of the South Burlington pupils attended schools operated by the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington or by a religious order of the Diocese
of Burlington. An action was brought in the Chancery Court to prevent the
school officials from disbursing out of tax monies payments for the tuition of
resident pupils attending Catholic high schools in other school districts. The
complaint charged that these payments violated the Vermont Constitution and
the first amendment of the Constitution of the United States. In the trial court,
the parties agreed on, and the Chancellor apparently adopted, the theory that
the first amendment of the Constitution of the United States and article 3, chap-
ter 1 of the Vermont Constitution were similar, and that a violation of the one
would constitute a violation of the other. However, in reaching his decision
that the challenged payments were illegal, the Chancellor relied exclusively on
the interpretation of the first amendment, finding that the payment of tuition
by the school district for pupils in sectarian schools selected by their parents and
guardians was prohibited by the first and fourteenth amendments."8
65 Id. at 313-14.
66 Swart v. South Burlington Town School District, 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514, cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 925 (1961).
67 The Vermont statute is representative of a widespread practice which has existed in
the United States for a long time, under which a school district which does not provide
school facilities is required by statute to arrange for some of its resident children to attend
a school not operated by the school district. In such instances, "tition is paid for them out
of public funds of the resident district." REmMLEIN, SCHOOL LAW 220 (1950). Statutory
provsins for the payment by the resident district of tuition in such circumstances generally
have been upheld in the state courts. Boggs v. School Township of Cass, 28 Ia. 15, 102
N.W. 796 (1905); and see the cases collected and discussed in Edwards, Courts and the
Public Schools 276 (1955). It is interesting that out of a total of 42,429 public school systems
of the United States, 21,646 of them did not provide any secondary education during 1960.
Public School Systems in 1960, Bureau of the Census, 5-6 (November 9, 1960).
68 Anderson v. Swart (No. 856, October Term, 1960) Supplement to Pet. for Writ of
Cert., March 29, 1961, pp. 2-6.
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On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court put aside discussion or decision
with respect to the possible relevant limits of the Vermont Constitution. It
was of the view that "in the domain of religious liberty, the resolute history of
the first amendment seems the more demanding." The Vermont Supreme Court
then went on to consider the question of the constitutionality of the tuition
payments under challenge solely "from the federal aspect."69 The Vermont
Court, placing heavy reliance on Justice Black's remarks in the Everson case,
as previously quoted herein, and the Supreme Court's decision in McCollum,
then decided that the defendant school board members "while acting within
the literal provisions of the [Vermont] statute, have exceeded the limits of the
United States Constitution.""
A petition for certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court of the United
States on March 29, 1961. As presented, the question raised by the petition was
whether "the payment of tuition to sectarian high schools selected by the parents
or guardians" violated the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.
However, the petition took note that under the statute, payments could be
made either to the schools or to the parents and guardians upon bills submitted."
The petition for certiorari was filed at a time when discussion and debate in
the Congress and in the press concerning both the wisdom and the constitu-
tionality of federal aid to sectarian schools was reaching its acrimonious height.
7
1
2
Legislation embracing the President's proposals for federal aid to public ele-
mentary and secondary schools, and excluding such aid to church-related schools
in these categories, had been introduced in the Congress just a month before
the petition for certiorari in the Anderson v. Swart case reached the Supreme
Court." After the petition had been filed, several editorials referred to the
pendency of the case, indicating their view that it furnished the Court an op-
portunity to clarify the question of the constitutionality of federal aid to sec-
tarian education.7"
Despite the controversy which raged outside its august chambers, the Su-
preme Court of the United States was not moved to speak on the burning sub-
ject, so far as it might have done so within the framework of the constitutional
issues involved in the Swart case; it denied certiorari on May 15, 1961." 5
As is usually the case, it is futile to speculate what the Court's denial of
certiorari meant. For those so inclined, several alternatives suggest themselves.
There is always the possibility that the Court believed that the Vermont Su-
preme Court had correctly decided the first amendment issue, at least so far
69 Swart v. South Burlington Town School District, 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514, 518(1961).
70 Id. at 521.
71 Anderson v. Swart, supra, note 68, Pet. for Cert., p. 2.
72 See, e.g., The Washington Evening Star, March 1, 1961, p. A-15; The Washington
Post and Times-Herald, March 9, 1961, p.A-17; The New York Times, March 8, 1961, p. 18;
The Catholic Standard, April 21, 1961, p. 6.
73 H.R. 4970, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced on February 29, 1961; S. 1021, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., introduced on February 20, 1961.
74 See, e.g., the editorial of The Washington Post and Times-Herald, April 3, 1961, at
p. A-10, observing that if the Court decided to review the Vermont case "any guidance that
its opinion may give to national policy [regarding federal aid to sectarian schools] will be
in the nature of a fortuitous by-product."
75 366 U.S. 925 (1961).
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as pertained to the payment of tuition directly to the sectarian schools. On the
other hand, the comprehensive and careful study prepared by the legal depart-
ment of the National Catholic Welfare Conference leans to the view that "the
real reason for the decision in Swart lay in the fact that the tuition payments,
which were made directly to the schools, were not in some manner apportioned
to the support of the nonreligious instruction given."m The authors of the peti-
tion fot certiorari in Swart and of this article are not so sure. More likely, the
Court was of the opinion that a sufficient non-federal ground existed on which
the Vermont Supreme Court decision could rest. If that were true, of course,
the federal question regarding the scope of the first and fourteenth amendments
would not have been necessary to review." While we believed at the time we
made it, and are still of the opinion, that the stronger argument is that the
Vermont Supreme Court explicitly based its decision on the determination
that the first amendment prohibited the tuition payments involved, neverthe-
less, the record below was sufficiently ambiguous as to permit the opposite con-
clusion. " In any event, if the Court were looking for an opportunity to avoid
getting into issues which were then receiving the excitable attention of the Con-
gress, the press, the clergy and the public, a denial of certiorari was an easy
way out. Indeed, advocates on both sides of the issue of federal aid to sectarian
education may have breathed easier after the Court declined to take jurisdic-
tion. Some of those favoring such aid, as the authors know, were concerned
lest the Court grant certiorari and then go on to affirm the decision of the Ver-
mont Supreme Court on the merits. Likewise, some of the opponents of federal
aid to sectarian education may have felt relieved that the Court did not use
the case as an opportunity to make clear that the "absolute separation" con-
cept which had come into being in McCollum but which had been considerably
restricted in Zorach, was to be further relaxed in favor of the public benefit
principle as presented in Swart.
In the Swart case the Court may have deliberately avoided decision of
the first amendment issues presented. In the Sunday closing law cases, de-
cided on May 29, 1961, the Court, obliquely but firmly touched upon such
questions." These cases involved the constitutionality of Sunday dosing laws
in effect in the States of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. While
there are some significant differences in the facts the basic pattern of the cases
and issues presented are substantially the same. Briefly, the Court was called
upon to determine whether various Sunday closing laws of the States referred
to, prohibiting the sale of certain merchandise as well as certain activities on
Sunday, violated the equal protection or due process laws of the fourteenth
amendment or constituted a law respecting an establishing of religion within
the meaning of the first amendment, now made applicable to the states by the
fourteenth amendment.
76 The Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church Related Schools In Federal Aid to
Education, a memorandum prepared by the Legal Department of the National Catholic
Welfare Conference (December 14, 1961), p. 29.
77 Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1934).
78 STERN & GRESSmAN SUPREME COURT PRAcTicE 98 (2d ed. 1954).
79 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market,
366 U.S. 617 (1961).
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The Court had no difficulty in finding that the classifications with respect
to the sales of merchandise or activities prohibited on Sunday did violate equal
protection. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren, then moved
on to find that, in the light of their evolution, the Sunday closing laws are of
a secular rather than of a religious character and as now constituted bear no
relationship to the establishment of religion, as those words are used in the
first amendment." With the results reached by the Court in the various Sun-
day Closing Law Cases, there should be little quarrel. A state-created or en-
forced "day of rest" serves secular ends beyond any benefit that may thereby
be conferred on those churches whose members observe the Sabbath on Sunday.
More disturbing to the proponents of federal aid to religious institutions may
be the fact of the Court's extended reaffirmance of their view that the legisla-
tive history of the first amendment as first spelled out by Justice Rutledge in
the Everson case remains an accurate statement of what the framers of the first
amendment intended and what the Congress which passed it had in mind
when it did so."' Again it was the Court's view that the first amendment must
be given a "broad interpretation . . . in the light of its history and the evils
it was designed forever to suppress .... "82 The Chief Justice then capped his
summary of the Court's understanding of the legislative history of the first
amendment by repeating the words of Justice Black in Everson which set out
the absolute separation concept in all its stem and stark scope.
The proponents of federal aid to sectarian education might take some
faint hope of better days or decisions ahead from the concurring opinion of
Justice Frankfurter, with whom Justice Harlan joined, in McGowan v. Mary-
land,' one of the four Sunday closing law cases. True, Justice Frankfurter
indicated that he too still adhered to the view that the legislative history of
the first amendment required that the no establishment clause be interpreted
to carry out "the fundamental separationist concept which it expresses .... "84
Nevertheless, he went on to state reassuringly that "once it is determined that
a challenged statute is supportable as implementing other substantial interests
than the promotion of belief, the guarantee prohibiting religious 'establishment'
is satisfied."8 Justice Douglas, the author of the majority opinion in Zorach,
dissented in the Sunday Closing Law Cases, being of the view that both free
exercise and the no establishment clauses of the first amendment were trans-
gressed by the Sunday laws under attack.8
Some commentators draw comfort from the Sunday Closing Law Cases,
at least from the Chief Justice's opinion in McGowan v. Maryland, finding the
decision as one which along with Zorach must be taken as a squelching of the
absolute concept of the separation principle which otherwise is derived from
80 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431-44 (1961).
81 Id. at 437-43.
82 Id. at 442.
83 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
84 Id. at 466.
85 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied).
86 Id. at 561, 581.
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the dicta in Everson and from the decision and dicta in McCollum.' We are
not so encouraged. The Court had to strain the history, tradition and evolu-
tion of Sunday laws in order to preserve the reasonable power of the States
to prescribe a certain day of rest for its citizens from an attack based on the
no establishment clause. Even more disheartening news to the proponents of
federal aid to religious schools than the Court's secularizing of the Sabbath
surely must lie in its continuing determination to stick to an understanding
of the legislative history of the first amendment that is not historically sup-
portable, as well as again manifesting an apparent concern that any act of
the federal government or of the states which is intended to confer any benefit,
however indirectly, on any or all organized religions may be a violation of the
first amendment. So long as the Court persists in that analysis, to invoke the
public benefit concept to preserve the constitutionality of federal or state aid
to religious institutions may be to lean on a very slim reed.
Finally, in the closing days of the 1960-61 term, the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Torcaso v. Watkins."8 Here, the Court held that
a provision of the Maryland Constitution which required State office holders,
including the appellant who sought a commission as a notary public, to de-
clare their belief in God, violated freedoms of belief and religion guaranteed
by the first amendment and protected by the fourteenth amendment from in-
fringement by the states. Article VI of the Federal Constitution, of course,
outlaws a ieligious test for qualification to any office of the United States. As
a result of Torcaso, it is now established that the fourteenth amendment, which
incorporates the principles of religious freedom protected by the first amend-
ment, bars religious test oaths as a requirement for state offices. Once more,
there appears to be little quarrel with the correctness of the decision reached by
the Court. The prescribed Maryland test oath was a direct infringement of
the religious freedom of those who do not accept the belief in a personal Deity,
and its imposition upon such persons as a condition of holding public office
seems a clear violation of the free exercise clause of the first amendment, now
made applicable to the states through the fourteenth. Again, however, what
is upsetting is not so much what the Court did but what it said. For example,
Justice Black, who wrote the opinion of the Court, used it as an occasion to
make it clear that his statements concerning "absolute separation," first made
in Everson, and so frequently referred to throughout this article, were not dicta
but apparently represent the entire Court's firm interpretation "of the scope
of the first amendment's coverage." Moreover, in Torcaso Justice Black put to
rest any lingering hopes that the Court's opinion in Zorach v. Clauson,9 "had in
part repudiated the statement in the Everson opinion quoted above and previous-
ly reaffirmed in McCollum."' °
87 The Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church Related Schools In Federal Aid to
Education, a memorandum prepared by the Legal Department of the National Catholic
Welfare Conference (December 14, 1961), p. 37.
88 367 U.S. 488 (1961)..
89 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
90 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494 (1961).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Some Concluding Observations
Early in the October, 1961 term, the Court granted certiorari in Engel
v. Vitale.9 In the proceedings below, the Court of Appeals of New York, speak-
ing in a split decision, had upheld the non-compulsory recitation in public
schools of a non-denominational "Regents Prayer" against the claim that this
was a violation of the first amendment's prohibition against an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. The prayer was worded
as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee and
we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country."
In an earlier case, Doremus v. Board of Education,92 the Court had avoided
review of a State court decision sustaining the constitutionality of Bible read-
ing in the New Jersey public schools on the grounds that the petitioners, whose
children were no longer in the school at the time the case was appealed to
the Supreme Court, lacked the necessary standing to challenge the practice.
Actually, it could be fairly argued that in Doremus, the Court for the first time
applied to a controversy arising in a state court the federal doctrine enunciated
in Massachusetts v. Mellon,93 that a taxpayer, without more, lacks the standing
to challenge the constitutionality of a statute.
If the Court reverses the Court of Appeals of New York and outlaws the
non-denominational "Regents Prayer," on first amendment grounds, a heavy
blow will have been struck in the name of the absolute separation concept.
Should that occur, the proponents of federal aid to sectarian schools who rely
upon the public benefit concept to sustain their position, so far as constitu-
tionality is concerned, will not have necessarily surrendered the field, but their
position will have been materially weakened. More importantly, if the Court
adds to its denial of certiorari in the Vermont school case, and some of its
remarks in the Sunday Closing Law Cases and again in Torcaso, by reversing
the lower courts in Engel v. Vitale94 those who are of the view, as President
Kennedy seems to be, that the first amendment of the Constitution forbids any
federal aid to sectarian schools (below the college and graduate school levels)
will have been provided with additional authority for their position. After
all, as Justice, then Attorney General, Jackson once remarked, the Supreme
Court "may not be final because it is infallible, but it is infallible because it
is final."
There is the opinion, and the authors share it, that if the Congress
were to pass school aid legislation which provided assistance, directly or in-
directly, to church-related schools, no one could ever successfully challenge the
constitutionality of such a statute. It was authoritatively decided in Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon,95 that an individual taxpayer, without more, does not have
standing to bring a suit to restrain the enforcement of an act of Congress
91 368 U.S. 924 (1961). The case was reported below in 10 N.Y.2d 579 (196,1).
92 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
93 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
94 368 U.S. 924 (1961).
95 262 U.S. 44-7, 488 (1923).
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authorizing appropriations of public money upon the ground that the act is
unconstitutional. As we read the case, Massachusetts v. Mellon was decided
on constitutional grounds. It quite clearly held that a taxpayer's suit challeng-
ing appropriations from the federal treasury was not a "judicial controversy"
within the meaning of article III of the Constitution." But even if this is the
accurate view and Massachusetts v. Mellon remains good law and a decision
which cannot be changed merely by an act of Congress, the fact is of little
persuasion in trying to convince the Congress to permit federal aid to sectarian
education in the face 'of consistent language and decisions on the part of the
Supreme Court which strongly suggest that such a statute would violate the
no establishment clause. In short, while President Kennedy and the administra-
tion's spokesmen in the Congress may have oversimplified or perhaps even are
mistaken concerning what is constitutionally permissible in the form of federal
aid to sectarian institutions, nevertheless, a search of recent Supreme Court
decisions for precedents to the contrary, with the possible exception of Zorach
v. Clauson,9" is a non-rewarding endeavor.
This is not to say that we believe that the Court has accepted an under-
standing of the first amendment which is firmly supportable in the history of
the amendment or the traditions of the nation. Still the prospects are unlikely
that the Court will jettison the interpretation of the intention of the no establish-
ment clause which it first adopted in Everson and to which it has consistently
adhered. Yet, there may be some hope in the slightly different approach which
Justice Frankfurter has taken of how the first amendment should be construed.
As he put it in McGowan v. Maryland,8 both the first and fourteenth amend-
ments must be looked at as "illuminated . . . by our national experience."
Justice Frankfurter, of course, shares the opinion that "national experience"
under the no establishment clause has been li the direction of the complete
secularization of public schools and, in his view, this is good and the way things
should be. On the other hand, "national experience" is not a static concept -
it may ebb and flow. "Separate but equal" was an accepted part of "national
experience" for many years until it finally gave way to the accumulating force
of our national conscience in the School Segregation Cases. So also may there
come a time when the already gross, but still not clearly grasped, inequity of
refusing to recognize (in the form of federal aid) the publice service functions
performed by church-related schools will cause "national experience" to have
a turn of direction, undertaken with the approval of the Supreme Court of
some subsequent day. Should that occur, as Professors Corwin and Crosskey
have established, it will have much sound support in history and in our national
traditions. For the foreseeable future, however, secularism dominates the field,
both in the Court and in the Congress, and those who analyze the decisions of
the Supreme Court with any care must confess it to be so, however deeply they
wish it were not.
96 Id. at 489.
97 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
98 366 U.S. 420, 463 (1961).
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As stated at the outset of this article, the authors are resolved to avoid ex-
pressing herein their own firm convictions regarding the wisdom or advisability
of federal aid to church-related schools. Now, at the finish, we depart from
this resolution in one particular. We believe, as we said, that in the long run,
"national experience," speaking through the majority of American citizens,
may recognize the need for and justice of a program of federal assistance,
whether by loans, tuition grants or otherwise, -to non-public, non-profit schools,
including church-related schools. However, progress toward that end will not
be achieved by florid and angry rhetoric emanating from clerical spokesmen
in high places, or through the threats of collective Catholic opposition to pro-
posals for federal assistance to the public schools alone, or through the indif-
ference of Catholics to the severe plight of the public school systems in many
of the poorer school districts of the nation. Rather, we believe, the achievement
of federal assistance to sectarian schools, including its ultimate validation in the
Courts, will be realized only because the case for it is sound and because it
has been carefully and effectively presented, without rancor or recrimination
even toward that vocal minority which opposes aid for parochial schools be-
cause it opposes the ancient faith which maintains such schools.
